The Great Centrifuge · ch 02
Heredity to the Middle Class
The Age of Heredity: Where Leadership Emerges, and Structures Solidify
If you zoom all the way out, the first few spins of the centrifuge, over thousands of years, up until about 1800, gave us a fundamentally two class structure.
In the beginning, society was flat. Our ability to manipulate matter was minimal: sharpened stones. Our ability to calculate was tied to our number of fingers. Our ability to organize ourselves was capped by neurology — Dunbar’s number — 150 people in the village that we could trust, remember, and organize.
And so, society stayed flat. Everyone contributed. Everyone observed. No layers. No hierarchy. Just memory.
Then came a crisis: A threat. A decision. Something the tribe couldn’t face with instinct alone. The centrifuge tilted, and a leader emerged.
Someone who could see further, act faster, inspire others. Get through the crises. Merit made visible.
That leader needed help. Helpers became staff. Roles began to form. Memory was no longer enough — structure appeared.
When the crisis was over, the leaders stayed in place. Then so did their sons. The centrifuge was taking hundreds, maybe thousands of years to spin. Heredity took priority over ability.
Power calcified, but this new structure was superior in many ways. It let us grow beyond 150. It let us discover mathematics, develop language, invent machines, store food. We cut rock and built monuments.
Society separated. Not into many layers: just two. This happened at different times in different geographies, but it was the same pattern globally, between roughly 3000 BC and 1800 AD. Earth converged on a common division: Leaders and Labor.
On the top: Pharaohs, priests, scribes, nobles — those who claimed divinity, held knowledge, coordinated the labor.
And below: workers, craftsmen, farmers — some conscripted, some paid, many born into generational service.
Many will point to apparent complexity in these ancient worlds — to Egypt’s court officials, Rome’s equestrian class, China’s scholar-officials, medieval Europe’s intricate feudal hierarchies. But look closer. These were not true middle classes with genuine mobility. They were merely variations within the same binary system — elite power-holders versus laboring masses. Lords might outrank knights, who outranked squires, but the fundamental division remained between those who ruled and those who toiled.
What appeared to be complexity was in fact just elaboration. The merchant who amassed wealth enough to rival a noble was still fundamentally an outsider to power, his position precarious, his children’s status uncertain. The rare peasant who joined the clergy still served the established order. These were exceptions that proved the rule, safety valves that prevented revolution rather than true pathways for mobility.
This was a much more productive form of organization than a single layer model. This rigid two-class system persisted for millennia, the foundation upon which civilizations rose and fell across the globe. By the dawn of the 1800s, the world stood at the precipice of transformation, as whispers of mobility between classes began to emerge.
We pushed the two layer model to its limits: it gave us steam power, complex mathematics, and printed knowledge. But then, the system started to break apart. We’d discovered electricity, and mass production, and the power of an educated workforce — and the old boundaries began to dissolve. The centrifuge was spinning faster now, sorting society with greater precision, creating gradients where once there were only walls.
The centrifuge still tilted from time to time. We had war, we had revolutions. The hype of revolutions exceeded their reality — they promised structural change but only shifted who reached the top layer and what words were used to describe the same things.
The Age of Partial Merit: How the Need for Talent Spun Up the Middle Class
The next few spins of the centrifuge, between the start of the Industrial Revolution, and the bloom of the Internet — created the middle class, and gave us a three-class system, which I believe lasted until about 1990, and many people still think we exist within.
Before about 1800, professions were hereditary. Your father was a blacksmith. You’re a blacksmith. Your last name is your job. My last name is Hopper. I guess my family made beer.
I do not think the emergence of upward mobility was driven primarily by values, or cultural revolutions: these certainly helped, although it is impossible to determine whether this was correlation or causation. I suspect these were an output of the centrifuge, rather than an input.
The driving force powering up the centrifuge? Competitive market forces, and an insatiable need for human talent.
We needed roads. Railways. Ports. Telegraphs. Factories. Restricting the search for talent to the leadership was fatal to many endeavours. Enterprises, companies, and governments had to find more talent — before their competitors could.
We needed the ability to plan. To operate. To design. To track inventory. To coordinate workers. To service machines.
We needed a middle layer, between the rulers and the labor.
For the first time, the system allowed people to move upward. If you could pass the exam, land the apprenticeship, navigate the guild, or build a business — you could rise.
Unions appeared. Merit started to matter — downward mobility was a possibility as well: You had to be good at your job to keep it.
And from this simple combination of market forces, advancing technology, and need for talent, the middle class emerged.
In 1800, just 5% of the world could be called “middle class.” By 1950, it was 20%. By 1990, nearly 45%.
This new mobility wasn’t universal. Many people were given the opportunity to rise, but only those with the right accent, appearance, passport, or network. Women remained largely excluded. Racial hierarchies persisted. Colonial subjects rarely had access to these new pathways. Geography determined destiny as much as ability.
Still, it was better than before. There was some opportunity for people to move up. In around 1990, I’d describe the layers of society very much as most people still think about them now — the upper, middle, and lower classes.
This partial merit system had an enormous impact on economic output and productivity. One generation of elevated talent started training the next — leading to the start of the exponential explosion of technology which we’re bearing witness to today. It let us scale production, services, healthcare, and communication.
In my view, it lasted until the arrival of the Internet, of social media, of mobile phones, of real-time trading platforms. With these technologies, the centrifuge began to spin at speeds never imagined — sorting talent with unprecedented precision while simultaneously blurring the very boundaries it created.
In the last three decades, for the first time, the spin started to be faster than a human career, which means people don’t just have to learn to rise, they need to learn in order to stay in the same spot.
The Information Age would demand something more than partial merit. It would need more than just credentials — it would need persistent performance and career long learning. And most importantly, as we became globally connected, people who were ‘world leading’ — in any field — would take a much larger share of the pie.